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Bristoe Station Battle Report: Heth's Report

No. 104. --Report of Maj. Gen. Henry Heth, C. S. Army, commanding division.
HEADQUARTERS HETH'S DIVISION, October 24, 1863.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my division on the 14th instant:

The division moved from camp near Warrenton at 5.30 a.m. on the 14th instant, following General Anderson's division. When within a mile of New Baltimore, orders were received to pass General Anderson's artillery by keeping to the right, as it was designed that my division should follow a different road.

After passing through New Baltimore, and about a mile and a half or less from the village, I was directed to take a right-hand road, which proved to be a cross-road leading to Bristoe Station, via Greenwich. Just before reaching Greenwich some 20 stragglers of the Third Corps, Federal Army, were captured. A desultory fire of artillery was heard from just after daybreak, apparently on our right, and continued during the entire day.

It was ascertained at Greenwich that a corps of the enemy had encamped there the night previous, the last of this corps leaving about 8 a.m. on the 14th. From Greenwich we pressed on by the most direct road to Bristoe Station, picking up a number of stragglers on the road. When within a mile and a half of Bristoe Station I was directed by General A. P. Hill to form three brigades of my division in line of battle perpendicular to the road on which we were advancing, holding the Fourth Brigade as a reserve, which was to continue its march by the flank. Cooke's brigade (leading) was formed on the right of the road, its left resting on the road. Kirkland was put in position on the left of the road, his right resting on the road and forming a continuous line with Cooke. Walker was directed to form on Kirkland's left. Davis' brigade was held in reserve in the road.

Kirkland had not quite completed the formation of his line, when orders were received from General Hill to push on with the two brigades then in line (Cooke's and Kirkland's), informing me at the same time that the enemy were retreating rapidly and that expedition was necessary. Walker's brigade was at this time in rear of Kirkland, his right resting in rear of Kirkland's right. General Walker was informed of the change and directed to form on Kirkland's left, if possible, as Kirkland moved forward.

The order was now given to advance. On reaching a cleared space some 200 or 300 yards in our front, the enemy was discovered about three-quarters of a mile in front of Kirkland's left. A few shots from one of Poague's batteries threw them into much confusion, and all that were in sight retreated in disorder across Broad Run. On seeing this General Hill directed me to move by the left flank, cross Broad Run, and attack the fugitives. This order was given and my line halted for the left to commence the flank movement. Before this movement was commenced information was received that a heavy column of the enemy had appeared on our right. I asked General Hill whether the flank movement should continue. He directed that it should be deferred for the present. Some ten minutes afterward I received orders to move forward.

About this time General Cooke in person reported to me that the enemy would take him in flank as he moved forward. This was reported to General Hill, who informed me that General Anderson's division had been, or would be, ordered to the right. General Cooke was informed of this, and the forward movement commenced. Walker had not been able to form line of battle on Kirkland's left. The two brigades (Cooke's and Kirkland's) moved off in handsome style. The skirmishers soon became engaged. The enemy's strength in my front was only known from the reports made by Captain Johnston, Engineer Corps. As subsequently shown, it proved to be Warren's, Second Army Corps.

Marching parallel to the railroad, the enemy was concealed from our view by hills and woods. On seeing our advance the enemy formed his line in rear of the railroad embankment, his right resting on Broad Run and hidden by a railroad cut. In his rear a line of hills ascended to some 30 or 40 feet in height, giving him an admirable position for his artillery. The railroad cut and embankment at the foot of the hill gave him perfect protection for his infantry.

In rear of the enemy's right, on the hills just noticed, a circular line of rifle-pits had been thrown up for the protection of the bridge over Broad Run. These rifle-pits were filled with infantry, and a battery was established in rear and higher up the hills.

As Kirkland moved forward his left struck the enemy in the railroad cut near Broad. Run. He drove everything in his front along the line of the railroad before him, but was unable to carry the second line of works (rifle-pits, &c.) that were in his front. When in the railroad cut his men were exposed to an enfilading fire from his right, in addition to a severe fire from a battery on the north side of Broad Run. The position was untenable. He was compelled to fall back. A number of his men, unwilling to expose themselves, remained in the railroad cut and were captured.

General Cooke was wounded early in the action. When within some 500 yards of the railroad, his brigade halted and commenced firing. It subsequently charged up to within 40 yards of the railroad embankment, but was driven back, being exposed not only to a heavy fire from the enemy behind the railroad embankment, but also to a fire on its right flank. The enemy's batteries, during the advance of Cooke and Kirkland, completely swept the field over which the advance was made. As soon as Cooke's brigade gave way, I ordered General Davis to form his brigade on Cooke's right, thus protecting Cooke from a flank movement.

During the advance of Cooke and Kirkland a battery belonging to McIntosh's battalion, Anderson's division, was ordered to take position on a hill about 500 or 600 yards from the railroad, and about opposite Kirkland's right flank and Cooke s left. This battery was captured by the enemy. I was ignorant of the fact that a battery had been ordered to occupy this position until it had been taken. A knowledge of its position on my part, however, would not have saved it, as it would not have been deemed necessary to have furnished a special support for it, so long as the two brigades (Cooke's and Kirkland's) were in its front. On receiving information that the enemy's skirmishers were approaching the battery, and that it was in danger, a regiment was ordered to its support, but arrived on the ground after five guns had been taken off.

During the advance of Kirkland, Walker gained ground to the left, crossing Broad Run. Finding that Kirkland's left was gaining ground to the right, General Walker recrossed the run. Before he could form on Kirkland's left, Kirkland had been driven back. General Walker during the rest of the engagement supported a battery from Poague's battalion, placed on a hill about 700 or 800 yards from the railroad. The engagement was over before' either Walker or Davis could be brought into action.

After the repulse of Cooke and Kirkland, I reformed my line and advanced again to within about 500 yards of the railroad, where I remained during the night. No second attack was ordered, as I was convinced that the position of the enemy was too strong to be attacked in front. The position now occupied enabled me to avail myself of an opportunity to resume the attack, in the event of an attack being made on the enemy's left flank by General Ewell's troops or others.

I deem it but just to the troops commanded by Generals Cooke and Kirkland to say that with the exception of one regiment, all behaved well under the circumstances. It must be borne in mind that when the attack was made by Cooke and Kirkland, the enemy's force in front was unknown. It turned out that a much larger force was in our front than was supposed--one, if not the greater portion of two entire corps. The position accidentally occupied by the enemy was as strong, or stronger, naturally and artificially, than military art could have made it by many hours' work. The enemy's left flank extended probably a mile or three-quarters to my right. He was not compelled to maneuver to get into position. Marching by the flank he was already in line of battle, protected by a railroad embankment at a convenient height to shelter his men, with hills in his rear admirably adapted to render effective his numerous batteries.

No military man who has examined the ground, or who understands the position and the disproportionate number of the contending forces, would attach blame to these two brigades for meeting with a repulse. My confidence in these troops is not shaken by the result, and I feel satisfied on fields to come they will vindicate the high reputation they have gained on many a hard-fought battle-field. Had they succeeded in driving the enemy in their front before them, and carried the hills beyond the railroad, it is probable the two brigades would have been captured by the enemy unengaged on their right.

I beg leave to bring to the notice of the lieutenant-general commanding the gallantry displayed by Generals Cooke and Kirkland, both of whom were severely wounded. I regret that in the absence of the reports of brigade and regimental commanders I am unable to name the officers who deserve special mention for good conduct.

A report of the casualties is inclosed. My thanks are due to my personal staff.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. HETH,

Major-general.

Capt. W. N. STARKE,

Assistant Adjutant-General, Third Army Corps.